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Abstract - This paper analyzes the relationship between employee participation in work teams, profit sharing 
and consultation between employees and management, and wages. It uses matched employee-establishment data 
from the British economy. It takes explicit account of selectivity that arises from self-selection of employees into 
their preferred establishments and selective adoption of participatory practices by employers. The estimates 
indicate wage premium for the employees who work in establishments with participatory practices. The 
selectivity appears to be an important factor in the relationship between employee participation and wages. The 
estimates without selectivity correction suggest a lower wage premium than that suggested by selectivity 
corrected estimates. The selectivity corrected estimates show that employees in establishment with any one, two 
or all of the participatory practices earn a wage premium of 18%, 32.7% and 55.1%, respectively. The estimates 
of the interaction model of participation and education indicate that an extra year of education earns lower wage 
premium in establishments with participatory practices than in establishments with no participatory practice. 
This finding suggests that the equalizing effect of employee participation can reduce wage inequality between 
high and low educated employees. 
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 1 Introduction
In recent years, work organization and compensation scheme have come to
the forefront of academic and management practitioners￿debate about the
e⁄ect of di⁄erent internal labour market rules on the performance of the ￿rm.
There has been a spate of empirical works examining the e⁄ect of employee
participation on di⁄erent dimensions of ￿rm performance. In these works
employee participation has often taken the form of work teams, quality cir-
cle, job rotation, pro￿t sharing and others that are deemed to reverse the
hierarchical organizational structure (Kato and Morishima 2002, Janod and
Saint-Martin 2004, Freeman et al. 2000, Ichniowski et al. 1997, Black and
Lynch 2001 and Hamilton et al. 2003). The broad picture that emerges from
this huge empirical literature is that employee participation has positive ef-
fect on labour productivity. As for the other dimensions of ￿rm performance,
like ￿nancial performance and product quality, the e⁄ect of employee partic-
ipation is not as convincing as its proponents might expect. Distinguishing
the levels of analysis, it is evident that the case study literature has been
more successful than establishment or ￿rm level studies to establish the sup-
posed relationship. In spite of immense interest shown by the economists and
management practitioners, the literature has mainly been focused on the re-
lationship between employee participation and organizational performance,
paying less attention to other issues of importance like employee welfare.
The e⁄ect of employee participation on ￿rm performance has direct im-
plication for the employees￿wages. The relationship between employee par-
ticipation and wages can be considered as a derived relationship from that
between employee participation and ￿rm performance. If employee partici-
pation in work teams and pro￿t sharing raises ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial performance,
one would expect that employees in such ￿rms earn more than those in
other ￿rms. Similarly, the positive productivity e⁄ect of employee participa-
tion would fetch higher wage in a competitive labour market. On the other
hand, if the employees value non-pecuniary (cooperation and socialization)
aspects of employee participation, they may be willing to accept a lower
wage. There exist very few studies on how employees bene￿t in an environ-
ment where work is organized around work teams and a considerable part of
compensation is based on the performance of the ￿rm. Also, there is little
known if the bene￿t accrued to the employer from employee participation is
shared with the employees. Speci￿cally, are the wages of employees working
in participatory ￿rms higher than those who are not? Are the employees in
participatory ￿rms paid less because they enjoy the non-pecuniary aspects of
their jobs? Are employees in the participatory ￿rms paid at par with employ-
1ees in non-participatory ￿rms, but the non-pecuniary aspects of the former
provide incentives for higher e⁄orts that fetch bene￿t to the employer? This
paper aims to answer these questions using matched employee-establishment
data from UK.
The small empirical literature on this issue examines the e⁄ect of bundles
of di⁄erent participatory practices on wages, with a considerable variation
in the composition of bundles across works of di⁄erent researchers. This
paper focuses on three dimensions of employee participation, namely work
teams, pro￿t sharing and consultation between employees and management,
and analyzes their e⁄ects on hourly wage. An additive index of these three
dimensions of employee participation is used to examine the e⁄ect of the
intensity of employee participation on wages. In spite of several documen-
tations and expectation, by academics and business commentators, of the
potential of employee participation for the ￿rm performance, the di⁄usion
of participatory practices has been limited and slow. This observation leads
to the issue of adoption of employee participation that has implication for
the analysis of wage e⁄ect. The empirical literature invariably ignores the
issue of selectivity in the analysis of wage e⁄ect of employee participation.
This paper takes explicit account of the selectivity that arises from the se-
lective adoption of participatory practices by employers and self-selection of
employees into their preferred participatory ￿rms. We ￿nd that OLS es-
timates without correction for selectivity under-estimate the wage e⁄ect of
employee participation. The selectivity corrected GLS estimates show that
wages increase by 12% when any of the three employee participation prac-
tices is present. The selectivity corrected wage gains are as high as 22% and
41% for employees who work in establishments with, respectively, two and
three employee participation practices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews
the theoretical views on the relationship between participatory work prac-
tices and employees￿wages. Section 3 presents brief review of the existing
empirical literature. Section 4 describes the data used for this study. Section
5 presents the estimation strategy. Estimation results and interpretation are
presented in section 6. The ￿nal section concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Discussion
There is no well developed theory for the relationship between employee par-
ticipation and wages. Economists and other social scientists have developed
2a number of theories that explain why wages di⁄er across individuals and
employers. Some of these theories can be applied to shed light on the rela-
tionship between employee participation and wages1. This section reviews
the theoretical strands that have implication for the relationship between
employee participation and wages. Broadly the theories can be identi￿ed as
representing four di⁄erent schools of thought.
The human capital theory predicts that employees with higher skill levels
earn higher wages. Skill is commonly meant to comprise of schooling, on-the-
job training and job experience. If the participatory practices are skill biased
i.e. e⁄ective implementation of participatory practices requires higher initial
skills, then ￿rms may adopt rigorous selection and hiring criteria to recruit
skilled employees, resulting in higher demand and wages for skilled employees.
Works by Caroli and van Reenen (2001) and by Osterman (2000) suggest that
organizational change may be skill biased. It is well known that training
raises the wages of the employees. Employer provided general and ￿rms-
speci￿c training that are required for employees to contribute e⁄ectively in
participatory environment can also increase their wages. Recently the notion
of skill is being extended to incorporate some other aspects of worker quality
such as communication skill, skills for collecting and interpreting information,
leadership skill and collaborative skill. If participatory practices require these
additional skills on the part of employees, the wages of the employees with
such skills will be higher than those without. Hamilton et al. (2003) show
that the productivity gains of teams partly derive from the e⁄ective use
of these non-technical skills. In particular, the collaborative skills of team
members generate spill-over e⁄ect of human capital that raises productivity
and wages of the team members.
An explanation of the relationship between employee participation and
wages can be derived from the theory of e¢ ciency wage that provides alter-
native rationales for why higher wages may lead to increased productivity.
The relevance of this theory for the participation-wages relationship comes
from the recognition that the ability of the employer to make employees con-
form to their authority is far from complete. Rather empirical sociologists
suggest the existence of a complex equilibrium in which o¢ cial work rules
exist side by side with a set of informal customs. The enforced rules are often
partial variations of both formal and informal norms. It is not di¢ cult to
imagine that employer￿ s authority is even less in participatory employment
than in individual employment. In this framework of incomplete authority
of employer, the loyalty of employees becomes an important contributor to
1For a recent review of the literature, see Handel & Levine (2004).
3high productivity. The e¢ ciency wage theory suggests that the loyalty of
employees is exchanged for high wages (Akerlof 1984). Another variant of
e¢ ciency wage theory focuses on the turnover cost to ￿rms (Salop 1979).
Turnover is costly to the ￿rm for its direct costs of orientation and training
and indirect cost of lower productivity during the adjustment period with
new entrants. As a result, ￿rms use wage policy to reduce turnover. The
experienced and trained employees are paid more to economize on turnover
cost. If implementation of participatory practices requires additional training
for the workforce, the cost consideration of employee turnover may lead to
higher wages for employees in ￿rms with employee participation than those
for employees in similar ￿rms without employee participation. The intuition
of Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) can also be applied to justify wage di⁄erential
between ￿rms with and without employee participation practices. They ar-
gue that in presence of involuntary unemployment paying employees more
than the "going wage" leads to higher cost of job-loss to the employees. This
potential cost of job-loss reduces employee￿ s incentive for shirking, given that
there is a positive probability of being caught for shirking and ￿red. In em-
ployee participatory practices the employer, who reserves the right to ￿re
an employee for shirking, is less e⁄ective in detecting shirking, since mon-
itoring is delegated to lower level employees who are in e⁄ect co-worker of
the shirking employee. With lower probability of being caught in ￿rms with
participatory practices than in other ￿rms, the cost of job-loss in the former
must be high enough to induce employees not to shirk.
The theory of organizational complementarity suggests that the combined
e⁄ect of participatory practices is greater than the sum of e⁄ects of individ-
ual practices (Milgrom & Roberts 1995). Kandel & Lazear (1992) argue that
e⁄ectiveness of teams is conditional on the presence of shared mode of com-
pensation. The introduction of variable pays enhance workers motivation as
well as shifts the earning risks to the employees (Lazear 2000). The e⁄ect
of this joint change on employees￿earnings will depend on the correlation
between employees￿e⁄orts and the objective measure on which the shared
compensation is based. A strong correlation between them not only moti-
vates the employees, but also institutes a culture of peer monitoring, sense
of ownership and identi￿cation with organizational goal, resulting in higher
performance and higher earnings. On the other hand, if the performance
measure is a bad proxy of employees e⁄ort, the e⁄ect on employees￿earnings
remains uncertain. Other channel through which shared mode of compen-
sation such as pro￿t sharing a⁄ects wages is the e⁄ect of pro￿t sharing on
turnover. Pro￿t sharing makes wages ￿ exible because the labour costs of a
￿rm with pro￿t sharing adjust automatically to its pro￿tability. This ￿ exibil-
4ity leads to lower employment reduction under adverse shocks a⁄ecting pro￿t.
Lower turnover raises the value of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital accumulation,
resulting in higher productivity and wages.
The principle of compensating wage di⁄erentials of Smith (1961) states
that di⁄erences in pecuniary wages are required to compensate for non-
pecuniary advantages and disadvantages of di⁄erent jobs. The hedonic pric-
ing version of the test of the principle de￿nes a job as a vector non-wage
attributes2. The pecuniary value of each attribute is not observable but is
implicit in a single wage rate attached to a job. Firms o⁄ering less desir-
able non-wage attributes have to pay higher wages to attract workers of a
given quality compared to ￿rms o⁄ering more favorable attributes. If jobs in
participation practices require higher e⁄orts and have the possibility of ter-
mination, ￿rms should o⁄er better wages to attract workers for these jobs.
On the other hand, if employees regard participatory practices as bene￿ts
because they make their job more interesting and relieve them from bore-
dom of monotonous jobs, then ￿rms may o⁄er them lower wages. Hamilton
et al. (2003) ￿nd that employees join work team even when their earnings
decreases. On the contrary, Brown (1980) ￿nds from a survey that employees
show less interest in non-pecuniary bene￿ts when it means foregoing some of
the pecuniary bene￿ts. So, it is not obvious if employees keep pecuniary and
non-pecuniary bene￿ts in separate mental accounts or they trade o⁄some of
pecuniary bene￿ts for non-pecuniary aspects of their jobs.
3 Previous Empirical Works
This section presents a brief review of the empirical literature on the e⁄ect of
employee participation on employees￿wages. Capelli and Carter (2000) use
a nationally representative sample of US establishments to analyze the e⁄ect
of "high performance work practice" and computer usage on employees￿pay.
They ￿nd that higher wages are associated with team work and computer
usage by front-line employees. The relationship appears to be weak in other
occupations and in non-manufacturing sectors.
Black et al. (2004) examine the e⁄ect of organizational innovation on
wages, wage-inequality, and employment changes. They use data from a rep-
resentative sample of U.S. manufacturing establishments. Data come from
2see McNabb (1989) for an empirical test of the compensating di⁄erentials principle
using hedonic wage equation.
5two periods, with a panel design for a sub-sample of establishments. Their
cross-section and ￿rst-di⁄erence estimation results show that organizational
innovation in the form of employee participation increases wages. As for the
distribution of wage gains, they ￿nd that non-production employees earn a
wage premium, while production employees￿pay remains una⁄ected. This is
consistent with their second ￿nding that organizational innovation increases
within establishment wage inequality. Finally, they ￿nd that the association
between di⁄erent workplace practices and employment changes is not sym-
metric across workplace practices; work teams are associated with higher
employment reduction than job-rotation is. The aggregate nature of vari-
ables (including the dependent variable for the wage equation, i.e. average
establishment wage) in their study makes it di¢ cult to draw a clear conclu-
sion about employees￿welfare.
Handel and Gittleman (2004) use data from a sample of U.S. non-agricultural
establishments. The survey also interviewed two employees of each establish-
ments covered in the main survey. They estimate three models: establish-
ment model (average establishment wage as the dependent variable), em-
ployee model (individual wage as the dependent variable) and interaction
model (taking account of di⁄erent forms of complementarity between prac-
tices). From their estimates, they conclude that employee involvement prac-
tices do not have a detectable e⁄ects on the wages of the employees. The
second model (employee model) might have failed to capture the true e⁄ects
because the number of employees surveyed from each establishment is too few
to be used for a serious test of the wage e⁄ect of organizational innovation.
Bailey et al. (2001) use survey data from 45 establishments in three in-
dustries - apparel, steel, and medical electronics and imaging. They ￿nd
that participatory practices like self-directed teams, autonomy in decision
making and communication have a positive association with the earning of
employees in steel and apparel industry. The association becomes insigni￿-
cant in medical electronincs and imaging industry when control for education
is introduced.
Forth and Millward (2004) use the same data set used for the present
study, the UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 1998. They
divide the nine workplace practices in three categories: task practices, indi-
vidual supports and organizational supports. Information contained in the
data set allows controlling for detailed individual and establishment charac-
teristics. Though they ￿nd non signi￿cant wage e⁄ects of most of the indi-
vidual practices, the variable counting the number of practices appears to be
6highly signi￿cant in individual wage equation. Also signi￿cant is the e⁄ect of
the dummy variable they de￿ned as "high-involvement management". An-
other important ￿nding is the existence of a wage premium from innovative
practices in presence of powerful trade union.
The works cited above and others in the literature do not take account of
who adopts new workplace practices or who joins such workplace. Though
the prescriptive literature on organization change has been obsessed to show
the bene￿ciary e⁄ects of new workplace practices, their adoption has not
been wide spread. A lot many ￿rms have changed their work organization
system, whereas a considerable number preferred to rely on old system. It
is plausible to assume that there exists a stochastic process that determines
the adoption of new practices and reasonably there exists a selection process
that determines the type of employees who work in changed systems.
4 Data
This paper uses the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998
(WERS￿ 98) data3 to analyze wage e⁄ect of employee participation. The
management questionnaire of WERS￿ 98 asks detailed information about the
establishment characteristics and labour relations practices of 2191 non-
agricultural establishments. In addition, it provides data on several dimen-
sions of employee participation in the establishment. The employee question-
naire contains information about weekly earnings, educational quali￿cation
and other individual characteristics of 25 randomly selected employees of each
establishment, or of all employees where the establishment has less than 25
employees. Data from establishments with 25 or more employees are used for
this analysis. The two data ￿les (management data ￿le and employee data
￿le) are matched to generate a unique data set that allows controlling for
di⁄erent individual and establishment characteristics. The analysis excludes
the public sector establishment as the pays in public sector establishment
are determined by a centralized process for which much information is not
available in the data set.
In order to estimate the wage e⁄ect of employee participation we need
a measure of employee participation in establishment. We consider three
3Department of Trade and Industry, Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service,
Workplace Employee Relations Survey : Cross-Section, 1998 [computer ￿le]. 6th ed.
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 23 January 2001. SN: 3955.
7dimensions of employee participation - team work, pro￿t sharing and consul-
tation with the management. The importance of consultation is less or indi-
rectly pronounced in the theoretical literature as compared to that of teams
and pro￿t sharing. Nevertheless, the industrial relations literature suggests
that in an era of reduced trade union power the joint consultative commit-
tee (JCC) between workers and management serves as a vital platform for
communication between the two levels. Usually work related issues are dis-
cussed in this committee, and valuable suggestions regarding improvement
of work and work condition are generated. From the management data ￿le
of WERS￿ 98 three dummy variables are constructed to represent these three
dimensions of employee participation. Establishment is classi￿ed as team
based workplace if 60% or more employees of largest occupational group are
involved in work teams. If the establishment has pro￿t sharing scheme for
the employees of non-managerial occupational groups it is considered to con-
tribute to the other dimension, shared mode of compensation, of the measure
of participatory system. The third dummy variable is constructed from the
presence of JCC in the establishment. Following Osterman (1994), a sin-
gle additive index of employee participation is constructed that takes the
following values
index = 0 if none of team, pro￿t sharing and JCC is present
in the establishment
= 1 if one of team, pro￿t sharing and JCC is present
= 2 if two of team, pro￿t sharing and JCC are present
= 3 if all of team, pro￿t sharing and JCC are present
The employee data ￿le contains information about weekly earnings in 12
bands and hours worked per week by an employee; the median of the band
an employee￿ s earning belong to is used to calculate hourly wage4. Other
variables used in the estimation include years of education, tenure, training,
demographic characteristics and several establishment characteristics. Ob-
servations with missing values are omitted. That leads to a ￿nal data set
of 10979 employees from 747 private sector establishments with 25 or more
employees.
4Battu et al. (2003) use similar method to calculate hourly earnings in their analysis
of educational spillover.
8                    Table 1: Employee participation and wage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Participatory practices Employees Establishments               Hourly wage
Mean Std. Dev.
None (y=0) 1,625 131 6.2176 3.5114
Any one (y=1) 3,368 230 6.7660 4.3796
Any two (y=2) 4,337 280 7.3690 4.7143
All (y=3) 1,649 106 7.9257 4.3566
Total 10,979 747 7.0972 4.4288
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1 gives the mean hourly wages for di⁄erent employee participation
sectors corresponding to di⁄erent values of the participation index. Details
of all variables are given in Appendix A. Mean hourly wage for the whole
sample is little more than £7. Mean wages are higher for the employees in
establishment with higher employee participation. Average education level
of the employees is more than 12 years. Mean years of education is lower
than 12 years for the employees with no participatory practice, whereas that
for the employees with at least one participatory practice is more than 12
years. There are 42% female employees and there is considerable variation
in terms of industry and occupational group.
5 Estimation Strategy
The empirical literature on the impact of employee participation on the out-
comes of interest ignores the issue of selectivity. In interpreting the empirical
￿ndings of the wage e⁄ect of employee participation, it is important to con-
sider both the employers who adopt such practices and the employees who
work in such environment. Though Black et al. (2004) among others mention
the importance of the issue, they do not account for the selectivity problem
in their econometric model.
Conceptually, selectivity or endogeneity or both can arise in wage-employee
participation relationship. It is well known that employers use job design and
compensation structure to screen the right type of workers for their jobs. The
process of selectivity can be conceptualized as matching between employer
and employees. The employers o⁄er a menu of jobs that includes speci￿cation
of workplace practices and compensation structures. The job speci￿cation
9a⁄ects the distribution of potential workers who accept the job. The employ-
ees select the job o⁄ers that suit them best. A successful matching occurs
when the seekers of a particular job are also the ones targeted by that job
speci￿cation. On the employer side, the decision to adopt a participatory
work practice, hence to o⁄er a job with participatory practices, depends on
industry, market condition, size of the establishment and training provisions
for the employees5. On the employee side, the decision to accept a job of-
fer in a participatory workplace depends on their perception on how they
￿t in the participatory workplace, and how they value the pecuniary and
non-pecuniary aspects of the job.
An appropriate econometric model for wage-employee participation rela-
tionship would account for the selectivity inherent in the relationship6. We
observe employee participation in four mutually exclusive groups. Suppose
that employee participation a⁄ects the wages of the employees through in-
tercept term. Then we can formulate the wage equations for four employee
participation sectors as
wi0 = ￿0 + Xi￿ + vi0 (1)
wi1 = ￿1 + Xi￿ + vi1 (2)
wi2 = ￿2 + Xi￿ + vi2 (3)
wi3 = ￿3 + Xi￿ + vi3 (4)
where
w is the log of individual hourly wage
X is the vector of explanatory variables in wage equation
￿0;￿1;￿2;￿3;￿ are the parameters of the equations
With j = 0;1;2;3 for four employee participation sectors and dij as the
dummies for these four sectors, the wage equations can be compactly written
as
wi = ￿0 +
3 X
j=1
(￿j ￿ ￿0)dij + Xi￿ + vi0 +
3 X
j=1
(vij ￿ vi0)dij (5)
The choice process underlying the matching between employers and em-
5Osterman (1994) and Pil and MacDu¢ e (1996) study the employer characteristics
that facilitate the adoption of employee participation practices.
6Reilly (1996) uses a selectivity correction approach to analyze the e⁄ect of union
density on wage.
10ployees in di⁄erent employee participation sectors can be modelled7 as
D
￿
i = Zi￿ + ui (6)
where D￿ is the latent variable underlying the observed variable D taking
values 0;1;2;3 for four employee participation sectors, Z is the vector of
explanatory variables (both employer level and employee level) for the choice
process and u is a random term. The vj￿ s of the wage equations and u are




0 ￿01 ￿02 ￿03 ￿0u
: ￿2
1 ￿12 ￿13 ￿1u
: : ￿2
2 ￿23 ￿2u
: : : ￿2
3 ￿3u
: : : : ￿2
u
where ￿2
j = V ar(vj) for j = 0;1;2;3, ￿2
u = V ar(u), and ￿01 = Cov(v0;v1),
￿12 = Cov(v1;v2) and so on. Suppose that the matching between employer
and employee is determined as follows
Di = 0 or dio = 1 i⁄ Zi￿ + ui ￿ c0
Di = 1 or di1 = 1 i⁄ c0 ￿ Zi￿ + ui ￿ c1
Di = 2 or di2 = 1 i⁄ c1 ￿ Zi￿ + ui ￿ c2
Di = 3 or di3 = 1 i⁄ c2 ￿ Zi￿ + ui
The selectivity in the wage determination precess implies that
E(vijjdij = 1) 6= 0 j = 0;1;2;3
Controlling for the selectivity requires correction of the error terms of the
wage equations incorporating the choice process. Since we observe employee
participation in four mutually exclusive and ordered groups, the distribution
of the latent variable is truncated around three points. Assuming standard
7It is possible to model the two components - employer side and employee side - of
the matching process separately, and combine them to represent the successful matching.
This approach leads to the same speci￿cation of the model presented here.
11normal distribution of the u, we have
Pr(di0 = 1) = Pr(Zi￿ + ui ￿ c0) = ￿
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
Pr(di1 = 1) = Pr(c0 ￿ Zi￿ + ui ￿ c1) =
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
Pr(di2 = 1) = Pr(c1 ￿ Zi￿ + ui ￿ c2) =
￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)
Pr(di3 = 1) = Pr(c2 ￿ Zi￿ + ui) =
￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
1 ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
The joint normality of the error terms in the wage equations and the choice
process implies that the former error terms satisfy the following8
E(vi0jdi0 = 1) = ￿￿0u
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
E(vi1jdi1 = 1) = ￿1u
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
E(vi2jdi2 = 1) = ￿2u
￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)
E(vi3jdi3 = 1) = ￿3u
￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
1 ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
The wage equations, after correcting for the selectivity, can be written as










wi1 = ￿1 + Xi￿ + ￿1u
￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)




￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c0 ￿ Zi￿)
￿
(8)
wi2 = ￿2 + Xi￿ + ￿2u
￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)




￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(c1 ￿ Zi￿)
￿
(9)
wi3 = ￿3 + Xi￿ + ￿3u
￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)





1 ￿ ￿(c2 ￿ Zi￿)
￿
(10)
8See Maddala (1983, p. 366) for univariate presentation of the results used here.
12Now the error terms (inside the square brackets) have zero means. The
selectivity corrected wage equations can be compactly written as
wi = ￿0 +
3 X
j=1








￿(cj￿1 ￿ Zi￿) ￿ ￿(cj ￿ Zi￿)



















(￿ij ￿ ￿i0) (11)
where ￿ij￿ s are the error terms of selectivity corrected wage equations for four
employee participation sectors. Though the error terms in the ￿nal equation
have zero means, they are heteroskedastic.
For the estimation of the selectivity corrected equation we proceed as
follows: ￿rst we estimate the ordered probit model, from the estimates of
￿ and c￿ s we calculate the correction terms, and ￿nally we estimate the
selectivity corrected equation by GLS method. The estimable form of the
equation is given in Appendix B.
6 Estimation Results
First the ordered probit model is estimated for the index of employee par-
ticipation using individual characteristics of the employees and several es-
tablishment characteristics. The establishment level variables include size of
the establishment, trade union presence and market conditions. The indus-
trial relations and management literature suggests that establishments with
larger size economize on communication costs by organizing work around
small teams. It is often argued that employers adopt more participatory
practices when they cater to a competitive market. We include controls for
several characteristics of the market. The industry dummies are also included
to control for the technology and other speci￿c e⁄ects of the industries. On
the employee side the control variables include educational quali￿cation, ex-
perience, training, occupation and other demographic characteristics. The
ordered probit estimates (given in Appendix C) show that employees with
13more education and training are more likely to join the participatory estab-
lishments. On the employer side, larger establishment size and more com-
petitive market are positively associated with the adoption of participatory
practices.
Given the probit estimates, the Mincerian wage equation is estimated for
the employees. The explanatory variables include education, tenure, train-
ing, demographics and several characteristics of job and industry. The es-
tablishment level variables for market conditions which are likely to a⁄ect
the adoption of participatory practices not wages are excluded for the esti-
mation of wage equation. For the purpose of comparison we estimate the
wage equation using two methods - OLS without correction for selectivity
and GLS with selectivity correction terms. Table 2 gives estimates of the
main parameters (details are left for Appendix C). The ￿rst column gives
the OLS estimates without correction for selectivity and the second column
gives selectivity corrected GLS estimates.
The wage e⁄ect of education is higher in simple OLS estimation than in
selectivity corrected GLS estimation. The OLS estimate suggests that an
extra year of education increases wage by 3.6%. The wage gain for an extra
year of education is about 3% according to the selectivity corrected estimate.
For other variables estimates are similar in both estimation methods. One
exception is establishment size9, OLS estimate suggests that the establish-
ment size has a positive signi￿cant e⁄ect on wages whereas the size e⁄ect in
GLS estimation is insigni￿cant. More training and higher tenure are asso-
ciated with higher wage. Most of the coe¢ cients have expected signs. The
selectivity correction terms in GLS estimation are all signi￿cant.
The OLS estimates of the dummy variables representing di⁄erent em-
ployee participation sectors are di⁄erent from those of GLS, though both set
of estimates indicate positive e⁄ects on wage. Since the omitted sector in
this set of dummy variables is "none of team, pro￿t sharing and JCC", the
estimates imply change of wage for a participatory sector as compared to
this omitted sector. Moreover, the econometric speci￿cation implies that the
coe¢ cient of the dummy variable of a participatory sector is the di⁄erence
between the intercept terms of the wage equations of that sector and of the
omitted sector. In other words, the wage equations of di⁄erent participatory
sectors are parallel and the coe¢ cients of the dummy variables capture the
shift of the wage equations from the sector with no employee participation.
9In all estimations - probit, OLS and GLS - log of number of employees is used, instead
of number of employees.
14                  Table 2: Estimates of the Wage Equation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           OLS estimates            GLS estimates
Variable Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics
Intercept 0.8325 22.44 0.8950 17.96
d(1) 0.0301 2.91 0.1656 3.78
d(2) 0.0311 2.97 0.2831 4.58
d(3) 0.0480 3.76 0.4393 4.66
Education 0.0364 20.27 0.0293 17.21
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OLS estimates suggest that having any one of the participatory prac-
tices increases the wage of the employees by 3%. The wage gain for having
two and three participatory practices are 3.1% and 4.9%, respectively. The
selectivity corrected GLS estimates give a di⁄erent picture, the wage gains
are higher for higher levels of employee participation. The wage gain for at
least one practice is 18%. The wage premium for any two and three participa-
tory practices are 32.7% and 55.1% respectively. It is evident that employee
participation has positive e⁄ect on the wages of the employees and the e⁄ect
is much higher than the simple estimation method can capture. It is also
apparent that ignoring the issue of selectivity can lead to downward biased
estimates of the actual e⁄ect.
The employer size premium, which has been documented in several em-
pirical studies, disappears as we control for selectivity. The indication of this
￿nding is that the employer size premium derives from adoption of participa-
tory practices and selectivity of workers into such practices. Futher investiga-
tion is required to resolve the issue. However, it is consistent with the theory
of organizational design that emphasize that larger employers economize on
coordination and monitoring costs by adopting employee participatory prac-
tices and employees are paid higher wages by large employers to compensate
for the additional responsibility of coordination with the co-worker and to
deter shirking in absence of centralized monitoring.
We investigate the wage e⁄ect of education in di⁄erent participatory sec-
tors. An interaction model is estimated to capture the wage e⁄ect of educa-
tion across participatory sectors. Estiamtes of the main parameters are given
in table 3 (details are in Appendix C). The e⁄ect of employee participation
exhibits similar pattern - wage gain is higher for higher employee partici-
pation. The e⁄ect of education exhibits a reverse pattern. The selectivity
15Table 3: Estimates of the Wage Equation (Interaction Model)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              OLS estimates               GLS estimates
Variable Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics
Intercept 0.8110 13.50 0.8383 12.29
d(1) 0.0137 0.23 0.1826 2.53
d(2) 0.0666 1.14 0.3608 4.36
d(3) 0.1256 1.83 0.5561 4.87
Education*d(0) 0.0382 8.69 0.0340 7.19
Education*d(1) 0.0395 14.32 0.0325 12.04
Education*d(2) 0.0353 14.47 0.0275 12.37
Education*d(3) 0.0319 8.54 0.0247 8.01
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
corrected GLS estimates show that the highest wage gain (3.4%) for an ex-
tra year of education is in no employee participation sector. The gain from
education gradually decreases for higher employee participation sectors. An
extra year of education earns the lowest wage gain (2.5%) in the employee
participation sector characterized by the presence of all employee participa-
tory practices. This ￿nding has implication for the wage gap between high
educated and low educated employees, hence for the wage inequality. It lends
support to the hypothesis that the emerging "paradigm of employment re-
lationship" can reverse the wage inequality between high educated and low
educated employees that has widened in last 30 years. It is also consistent
with the view that high educated employees join participatory systems in
spite of lower wage gain for their education. The ￿ndings that high educated
employees tend to join participatory establishments and that education earns
a lower wage premium in participatory establishments suggests the existence
of non-pecuniary bene￿ts for high educated employees. Data shows that em-
ployee heterogeneity in terms of education is higher in establishments with
more employee participation practices. The non-pecuniary bene￿ts for high
educated employees, thus, can be in the form of leadership. Similarly the
wage gains for less educated employees can derive from peer learning from
high educated employees and human capital spill-over of high educated em-
ployees.
In the data set we have valid observations for 9218 full-time employees -
those who work 30 or more hours a week. We estimate the wage equation
for the full time employees. Main estimates are given in table 4 (details in
Appendix C). The selectivity correction terms are all signi￿cant. The pattern
is similar to the estimates for all employees. The wage gains are 13%, 27.7%
16Table 4: Estimates of the Wage Equation (Full-time employees)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           OLS estimates            GLS estimates
Variable Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics
Intercept 0.4095 10.01 0.5189 10.10
d(1) 0.0319 3.06 0.1223 2.91
d(2) 0.0369 3.50 0.2448 4.06
d(3) 0.0537 4.17 0.3907 4.23
Education 0.0365 20.87 0.0298 17.75
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and 47.8% for having respectively one, two and all employee participatory
practices.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the wage e⁄ect of employee participation
practices - work team, pro￿t sharing and joint consultative committee - us-
ing matched employee-establishment data. Using an additive index of em-
ployee participation we ￿nd that employee participation raises the hourly
wage of the employees. Wage gains are higher for higher levels of employee
participation.
We take explicit account of the selectivity that arises because of selective
adoption of employee participation practices by employers and self-selection
of employees into preferred participatory establishments. It is evident that
the simple OLS method under-estimates the e⁄ect of employee participation
on wage. The selectivity corrected GLS estimates show that the presence
of one employee participatory practice raises the hourly wage by 18%. The
wage gain for two and three employee participation practices are 32.7% and
55.1% respectively. The pattern of wage gains remains similar when only
full-time employees are considered.
There is indication that the employer size premium results from the selec-
tivity that arises from large employers o⁄ering job-design and compensation
schemes to attract a particular type of workers. So when control is taken
for selectivity the employer size premium disappears. However, futher in-
vestigation is required to resolve this issue. The estimates show that the
wage gain for higher education is lower in participatory establishment than
in traditionally organized establishments, indicating an equalizing e⁄ect of
17employee participatory practices. In spite of lower wage gains high educated
employees tend to join participatory practices, suggesting the existence of
non-pecuniary bene￿ts for high educated employees. On the other hand,
less educated employees￿wage gain can be the result of peer learning and
human capital spill-over in participatory establishments with heterogenous
education levels.
This ￿ndings have important policy implications. The policy measures
to promote employee participation to boost competitiveness of the economy
can also put downward pressure on the growing wage inequality between high
educated and less educated employees. Since most of the employee partici-
patory practices involve employees from the bottom end of the occupational
ladder, these policy measures can reverse the trend of creation of "bad job"
for the these employees.
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20A Appendix A
                   Employee Level Variables
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Hourly wage (median of the earnings band)/(hours worked) 7.0972 4.4288
Education Years of education: converted from highest 12.3707 2.2760
educational qualification; no qualification
(10 years), CSE/GCE/O-level (11 years),
A-level (13 years), Degree (16years), Higher
degree (18 years). For vocational training one
extra year is added.
Tenure
(ref. is less than 1 yr)
Tenure1to2 1 for tenure between 1 and 2 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.1257 0.3315
Tenure2to5 1 for tenure between 2 and 5 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.2310 0.4215
Tenure5to10 1 for tenure between 5 and 10 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.2058 0.4043
Tenure10 1 for tenure more than 10 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.2607 0.4390
Training
(ref. is no training)
Training1 1 if the employee had 1 day training, 0 otherwise 0.0964 0.2951
Training1to2 1 if the employee had 1 to 2 days training, 0 otherwise 0.1212 0.3264
Training2to5 1 if the employee had 2 to 5 days training, 0 otherwise 0.1861 0.3892
Training5to10 1 if the employee had 5 to 10 days training, 0 otherwise 0.0916 0.2885
Training10 1 if the employee had more than 10 days training, 0 otherwise 0.0902 0.2864
Disability 1 if the employee has physical disability, 0 otherwise 0.0527 0.2235
Ethnic 1 if the employee has ethnic origin, 0 otherwise 0.0390 0.1936
Job type
(ref. is temporary)
Permanent 1 if he job is permanent, 0 otherwise 0.9554 0.2065
Fixed term 1 if the job is fixed-term, 0 otherwise 0.9554 0.2065
Female 1 if the employee is female, 0 otherwise 0.4170 0.4931
Age
(ref. is less than 20 yrs)
Age20to24 1 if age is between 20 and 24 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.0944 0.2923
Age25to29 1 if age is between 25 and 29 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.1484 0.3555
Age30to39 1 if age is between 30 and 39 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.2748 0.4464
Age40to49 1 if age is between 40 and 49 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.2242 0.4170
Age50to59 1 if age is between 50 and 60 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.1691 0.3749
Age60 1 if age is more than 60 yrs, 0 otherwise 0.0336 0.1802
Occupational Group
(ref. is unskilled)
Managerial 1 for managerial job, 0 otherwise 0.1171 0.3216
Professional 1 for professional job, 0 otherwise 0.0880 0.2833
Assist. prof & technical 1 for assistant professional & technical, 0 otherwise 0.0815 0.2736
Clerical & Secretarial 1 for clerical & secretarial, 0 otherwise 0.1985 0.3989
Craft & Skilled 1 for craft & skilled job, 0 otherwise 0.1176 0.3221
Personal & Protective 1 for personal & protective services, 0 otherwise 0.0247 0.1552
Sales 1 for sales job, 0 otherwise 0.1351 0.3418
Operative & assembly 1 for operative & assembly job, 0 otherwise 0.1558 0.3627
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21              Establishment Level Variables
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Participation dummies
(ref. none of the three)
d(1) 1 if one of team, profit-sharing & JCC, 0 otherwise 0.3068 0.4612
d(2) 1 if two of team, profit-sharing & JCC, 0 otherwise 0.3950 0.4889
d(3) 1 if all of team, profit-sharing & JCC, 0 otherwise 0.1502 0.3573
Size number of employees in the establishment 283.5227 669.8967
Union
(Ref. is no recognized trade union)
Single trade union 1 if single recognized trade union, 0 otherwise 0.2879 0.4528
Multiple trade union 1 if multiple recognized trade union, 0 otherwise 0.2722 0.4451
Competition
(ref. is no competitor)
Few comp 1 if number of competitors is less than 5, 0 otherwise 0.3322 0.4710
Many comp 1 for number of competitors is more than 5, 0 otherwise 0.6104 0.4877
Mkt. condition
(ref. is stable market)
Growing mkt. 1 if the mkt. is growing, 0 otherwise 0.4812 0.4997
Declining mkt. 1 if the mkt. is declining, 0 otherwise 0.0751 0.2635
Turbulent mkt. 1 if the mkt. is turbulent, 0 otherwise 0.1603 0.3669
Industry
(ref. is manufacturing)
EGW 1 for electricity, gas & water industry, 0 otherwise 0.0580 0.2338
Construction 1 for construction industry, 0 otherwise 0.0526 0.2233
W&R 1 for wholesale & retail, 0 otherwise 0.2209 0.4149
H&R 1 for hotel & restaurant, 0 otherwise 0.0635 0.2438
T&C 1 for transport & communication, 0 otherwise 0.0767 0.2661
Financial services 1 for financial services, 0 otherwise 0.1098 0.3126
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23The ￿nal form can be estimated once the correction terms are known
(from 1st stage estimation).
A Appendix C
24                           Ordered Probit Estimates
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Education 0.0198 0.0059 3.36
Tenure1to2 -0.0768 0.0384 -2.00
Tenure2to5 0.0125 0.0340 0.37
Tenure5to10 0.0416 0.0361 1.15
Tenure10 0.0821 0.0369 2.22
Training1 0.1800 0.0378 4.76
Training1to2 0.2264 0.0347 6.52
Training2to5 0.2372 0.0307 7.72
Training5to10 0.2516 0.0397 6.35
Training10 0.2536 0.0400 6.35
Disability -0.0174 0.0469 -0.37
Ethnic -0.1405 0.0539 -2.61
Permanent 0.1920 0.0665 2.89
Fixed term 0.1877 0.1028 1.83
Female 0.0326 0.0254 1.28
Age20to24 0.0490 0.0573 0.85
Age25to29 0.0556 0.0550 1.01
Age30to39 0.0236 0.0527 0.45
Age40to49 0.0476 0.0542 0.88
Age50to59 0.0591 0.0561 1.05
Age60 -0.0093 0.0760 -0.12
Managerial 0.2317 0.0523 4.43
Professional 0.3777 0.0587 6.43
Assist.. prof & technical 0.2808 0.0566 4.96
Clerical & Secretarial 0.3441 0.0482 7.14
Craft & Skilled 0.0735 0.0513 1.43
Personal & Protective -0.0571 0.0779 -0.73
Sales 0.2589 0.0509 5.08
Operative & assembly 0.2253 0.0490 4.60
Size 0.2588 0.0111 23.25
Single union 0.0383 0.0272 1.41
Multiple union 0.2796 0.0328 8.53
Few comp 0.2920 0.0538 5.42
Many comp 0.2520 0.0539 4.68
Growing mkt. -0.1178 0.0256 -4.61
Declining mkt. -0.4282 0.0440 -9.73
Turbulent mkt. -0.3655 0.0332 -11.01
EGW 0.9419 0.0603 15.62
Construction -0.4437 0.0540 -8.22
W&R 0.3742 0.0379 9.87
H&R 0.0443 0.0548 0.81
T&C 0.1051 0.0429 2.45
Financial services 0.5917 0.0439 13.47





25                                   OLS Estimates
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept 0.8325 0.0371 22.44
d(1) 0.0301 0.0103 2.91
d(2) 0.0311 0.0105 2.97
d(3) 0.0480 0.0128 3.76
Education 0.0364 0.0018 20.27
Tenure1to2 0.0148 0.0117 1.27
Tenure2to5 0.0476 0.0104 4.59
Tenure5to10 0.0703 0.0110 6.40
Tenure10 0.1136 0.0112 10.14
Training1 0.0186 0.0116 1.60
Training1to2 0.0470 0.0106 4.44
Training2to5 0.0534 0.0094 5.71
Training5to10 0.0500 0.0120 4.15
Training10 -0.0123 0.0122 -1.01
Disability -0.0384 0.0142 -2.69
Ethnic -0.0131 0.0165 -0.80
Permanent 0.0247 0.0201 1.23
Fixed term -0.0720 0.0310 -2.33
Female -0.1106 0.0078 -14.25
Age20to24 -0.0153 0.0175 -0.87
Age25to29 0.1077 0.0168 6.42
Age30to39 0.2238 0.0161 13.93
Age40to49 0.2168 0.0165 13.11
Age50to59 0.2034 0.0171 11.90
Age60 0.1447 0.0231 6.26
Managerial 0.5346 0.0159 33.52
Professional 0.4814 0.0179 26.94
Assist.. prof & technical 0.3957 0.0172 22.96
Clerical & Secretarial 0.1745 0.0147 11.88
Craft & Skilled 0.1685 0.0155 10.85
Personal & Protective -0.0188 0.0236 -0.80
Sales 0.1266 0.0156 8.12
Operative & assembly 0.0072 0.0149 0.48
Size 0.0214 0.0034 6.27
Single union -0.0518 0.0083 -6.23
Multiple union 0.0627 0.0100 6.28
EGW 0.0917 0.0158 5.80
Construction 0.0168 0.0159 1.05
W&R -0.0615 0.0116 -5.31
H&R -0.2240 0.0165 -13.57
T&C -0.0183 0.0131 -1.40
Financial services 0.1241 0.0129 9.60
Obs 0.0511 0.0120 4.24
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26           GLS Estimates with Correction for Selectivity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept 0.8950 0.0498 17.96
d(1) 0.1656 0.0438 3.78
d(2) 0.2831 0.0618 4.58
d(3) 0.4393 0.0942 4.66
Education 0.0293 0.0017 17.21
Tenure1to2 0.0240 0.0124 1.94
Tenure2to5 0.0473 0.0106 4.45
Tenure5to10 0.0676 0.0109 6.19
Tenure10 0.1058 0.0112 9.48
Training1 0.0007 0.0117 0.06
Training1to2 0.0226 0.0110 2.05
Training2to5 0.0293 0.0101 2.91
Training5to10 0.0286 0.0125 2.29
Training10 -0.0129 0.0134 -0.96
Disability -0.0289 0.0132 -2.18
Ethnic -0.0013 0.0188 -0.07
Permanent 0.0415 0.0223 1.86
Fixed term -0.0426 0.0344 -1.24
Female -0.1279 0.0075 -17.07
Age20to24 -0.0249 0.0220 -1.13
Age25to29 0.0953 0.0213 4.48
Age30to39 0.2099 0.0209 10.02
Age40to49 0.2018 0.0212 9.53
Age50to59 0.1926 0.0215 8.95
Age60 0.1451 0.0257 5.64
Managerial 0.5212 0.0172 30.25
Professional 0.4571 0.0194 23.54
Assist.. prof & technical 0.3744 0.0184 20.31
Clerical & Secretarial 0.1586 0.0164 9.65
Craft & Skilled 0.1673 0.0159 10.50
Personal & Protective 0.0231 0.0285 0.81
Sales 0.0885 0.0173 5.10
Operative & assembly -0.0059 0.0158 -0.37
Size -0.0023 0.0063 -0.37
Single union -0.0568 0.0082 -6.96
Multiple union 0.0379 0.0108 3.50
EGW 0.0211 0.0214 0.99
Construction 0.0714 0.0179 3.99
W&R -0.0980 0.0132 -7.40
H&R -0.2508 0.0160 -15.69
T&C -0.0399 0.0119 -3.34
Financial services 0.0575 0.0165 3.47
Obs 0.0554 0.0128 4.32
Correction term (0) -0.1221 0.0329 -3.71
Correction term (1) -0.1010 0.0244 -4.14
Correction term (2) -0.1148 0.0250 -4.60
Correction term (3) -0.1139 0.0318 -3.58
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27                    OLS Estimates (Interaction Model)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept 0.8110 0.0601 13.50
d(1) 0.0137 0.0604 0.23
d(2) 0.0666 0.0586 1.14
d(3) 0.1256 0.0688 1.83
Education*d(0) 0.0382 0.0044 8.69
Education*d(1) 0.0395 0.0028 14.32
Education*d(2) 0.0353 0.0024 14.47
Education*d(3) 0.0319 0.0037 8.54
Tenure1to2 0.0143 0.0117 1.22
Tenure2to5 0.0473 0.0104 4.57
Tenure5to10 0.0702 0.0110 6.39
Tenure10 0.1131 0.0112 10.09
Training1 0.0182 0.0116 1.57
Training1to2 0.0467 0.0106 4.41
Training2to5 0.0533 0.0094 5.69
Training5to10 0.0501 0.0120 4.16
Training10 -0.0121 0.0122 -0.99
Disability -0.0381 0.0142 -2.68
Ethnic -0.0132 0.0165 -0.80
Permanent 0.0252 0.0201 1.25
Fixed term -0.0715 0.0310 -2.31
Female -0.1105 0.0078 -14.23
Age20to24 -0.0156 0.0175 -0.89
Age25to29 0.1074 0.0168 6.40
Age30to39 0.2237 0.0161 13.92
Age40to49 0.2166 0.0165 13.10
Age50to59 0.2033 0.0171 11.89
Age60 0.1449 0.0231 6.27
Managerial 0.5338 0.0160 33.46
Professional 0.4817 0.0179 26.95
Assist.. prof & technical 0.3950 0.0172 22.91
Clerical & Secretarial 0.1732 0.0147 11.76
Craft & Skilled 0.1676 0.0155 10.78
Personal & Protective -0.0202 0.0236 -0.86
Sales 0.1254 0.0156 8.04
Operative & assembly 0.0069 0.0149 0.46
Size 0.0215 0.0034 6.30
Single union -0.0518 0.0083 -6.23
Multiple union 0.0629 0.0100 6.29
EGW 0.0932 0.0158 5.89
Construction 0.0175 0.0159 1.10
W&R -0.0612 0.0116 -5.29
H&R -0.2241 0.0165 -13.58
T&C -0.0182 0.0131 -1.39
Financial services 0.1245 0.0129 9.62
Obs 0.0507 0.0121 4.20
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28   GLS Estimates with Correction for Selectivity (Interaction Model)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept 0.8383 0.0682 12.29
d(1) 0.1826 0.0722 2.53
d(2) 0.3608 0.0828 4.36
d(3) 0.5561 0.1142 4.87
Education*d(0) 0.0340 0.0047 7.19
Education*d(1) 0.0325 0.0027 12.04
Education*d(2) 0.0275 0.0022 12.37
Education*d(3) 0.0247 0.0031 8.01
Tenure1to2 0.0238 0.0124 1.92
Tenure2to5 0.0473 0.0106 4.45
Tenure5to10 0.0683 0.0109 6.25
Tenure10 0.1045 0.0112 9.36
Training1 0.0005 0.0117 0.04
Training1to2 0.0223 0.0110 2.03
Training2to5 0.0282 0.0101 2.80
Training5to10 0.0290 0.0125 2.32
Training10 -0.0112 0.0134 -0.84
Disability -0.0279 0.0133 -2.11
Ethnic -0.0003 0.0188 -0.01
Permanent 0.0419 0.0224 1.87
Fixed term -0.0434 0.0344 -1.26
Female -0.1266 0.0075 -16.91
Age20to24 -0.0252 0.0220 -1.14
Age25to29 0.0950 0.0213 4.46
Age30to39 0.2096 0.0210 9.99
Age40to49 0.2026 0.0212 9.55
Age50to59 0.1930 0.0216 8.95
Age60 0.1450 0.0258 5.62
Managerial 0.5214 0.0173 30.23
Professional 0.4600 0.0194 23.73
Assist.. prof & technical 0.3756 0.0184 20.37
Clerical & Secretarial 0.1570 0.0165 9.53
Craft & Skilled 0.1673 0.0160 10.47
Personal & Protective 0.0189 0.0285 0.66
Sales 0.0875 0.0174 5.03
Operative & assembly -0.0059 0.0159 -0.37
Size -0.0021 0.0063 -0.33
Single union -0.0574 0.0082 -7.04
Multiple union 0.0375 0.0108 3.46
EGW 0.0227 0.0214 1.06
Construction 0.0715 0.0178 4.02
W&R -0.0965 0.0132 -7.29
H&R -0.2501 0.0159 -15.68
T&C -0.0387 0.0120 -3.24
Financial services 0.0587 0.0165 3.55
Obs 0.0554 0.0129 4.30
Correction term (0) -0.1218 0.0332 -3.67
Correction term (1) -0.0975 0.0245 -3.99
Correction term (2) -0.1161 0.0250 -4.64
Correction term (3) -0.1173 0.0319 -3.67
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29        Ordered Probit Estimates (Full-time employees)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Education 0.0192 0.0063 3.04
Tenure1to2 -0.0723 0.0439 -1.65
Tenure2to5 -0.0215 0.0380 -0.57
Tenure5to10 0.0131 0.0398 0.33
Tenure10 0.0023 0.0406 0.06
Training1 0.2195 0.0445 4.94
Training1to2 0.2180 0.0384 5.68
Training2to5 0.2043 0.0332 6.16
Training5to10 0.2363 0.0423 5.58
Training10 0.2332 0.0423 5.52
Disability -0.0232 0.0516 -0.45
Ethnic -0.1819 0.0602 -3.02
Permanent 0.2837 0.0889 3.19
Fixed term 0.2109 0.1253 1.68
Female 0.0737 0.0284 2.60
Age20to24 -0.0470 0.0756 -0.62
Age25to29 -0.0433 0.0732 -0.59
Age30to39 -0.0761 0.0719 -1.06
Age40to49 -0.0723 0.0732 -0.99
Age50to59 -0.0483 0.0749 -0.64
Age60 -0.1195 0.0970 -1.23
Managerial 0.1915 0.0605 3.17
Professional 0.3180 0.0666 4.77
Assist.. prof & technical 0.2267 0.0644 3.52
Clerical & Secretarial 0.2332 0.0590 3.95
Craft & Skilled 0.0162 0.0588 0.28
Personal & Protective -0.0713 0.0936 -0.76
Sales 0.1825 0.0667 2.73
Operative & assembly 0.1719 0.0573 3.00
Size 0.2537 0.0122 20.86
Single union 0.1283 0.0306 4.20
Multiple union 0.3937 0.0351 11.21
Few comp 0.3148 0.0565 5.57
Many comp 0.2666 0.0567 4.71
Growing mkt. -0.1125 0.0277 -4.07
Declining mkt. -0.4494 0.0465 -9.66
Turbulent mkt. -0.3397 0.0359 -9.47
EGW 0.9661 0.0620 15.59
Construction -0.4255 0.0555 -7.66
W&R 0.3635 0.0409 8.88
H&R 0.0486 0.0606 0.80
T&C 0.0970 0.0440 2.20
Financial services 0.5720 0.0467 12.25





30                   OLS Estimates (Full-time employees)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept 0.4095 0.0409 10.01
d(1) 0.0319 0.0105 3.06
d(2) 0.0369 0.0105 3.50
d(3) 0.0537 0.0129 4.17
Education 0.0365 0.0017 20.87
Tenure1to2 0.0146 0.0122 1.20
Tenure2to5 0.0603 0.0105 5.72
Tenure5to10 0.0837 0.0110 7.60
Tenure10 0.1216 0.0112 10.85
Training1 0.0087 0.0124 0.70
Training1to2 0.0572 0.0107 5.37
Training2to5 0.0644 0.0092 7.00
Training5to10 0.0653 0.0117 5.59
Training10 0.0257 0.0117 2.20
Disability -0.0348 0.0143 -2.43
Ethnic -0.0503 0.0168 -3.00
Permanent 0.0711 0.0244 2.91
Fixed term -0.0156 0.0343 -0.46
Female -0.1212 0.0079 -15.38
Age20to24 0.2477 0.0210 11.81
Age25to29 0.3874 0.0203 19.07
Age30to39 0.5095 0.0199 25.57
Age40to49 0.5135 0.0203 25.29
Age50to59 0.5027 0.0208 24.21
Age60 0.4597 0.0268 17.14
Managerial 0.5785 0.0168 34.46
Professional 0.5242 0.0185 28.38
Assist.. prof & technical 0.4411 0.0179 24.68
Clerical & Secretarial 0.2659 0.0164 16.24
Craft & Skilled 0.2283 0.0162 14.06
Personal & Protective -0.0300 0.0259 -1.16
Sales 0.1928 0.0186 10.37
Operative & assembly 0.0670 0.0159 4.22
Size 0.0252 0.0034 7.44
Single union -0.0561 0.0085 -6.63
Multiple union 0.0570 0.0098 5.83
EGW 0.0786 0.0147 5.33
Construction 0.0253 0.0149 1.70
W&R -0.0622 0.0114 -5.45
H&R -0.2279 0.0166 -13.69
T&C -0.0242 0.0122 -1.98
Financial services 0.1137 0.0125 9.08
Obs 0.0649 0.0116 5.60
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31GLS Estimates with Correction for Selectivity (Full-time employees)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept 0.5189 0.0514 10.10
d(1) 0.1223 0.0421 2.91
d(2) 0.2448 0.0604 4.06
d(3) 0.3907 0.0924 4.23
Education 0.0298 0.0017 17.75
Tenure1to2 0.0199 0.0128 1.56
Tenure2to5 0.0582 0.0108 5.39
Tenure5to10 0.0787 0.0110 7.18
Tenure10 0.1153 0.0111 10.41
Training1 -0.0069 0.0131 -0.53
Training1to2 0.0353 0.0109 3.25
Training2to5 0.0397 0.0098 4.07
Training5to10 0.0426 0.0123 3.47
Training10 0.0103 0.0128 0.80
Disability -0.0278 0.0130 -2.14
Ethnic -0.0306 0.0170 -1.80
Permanent 0.0656 0.0243 2.70
Fixed term -0.0067 0.0365 -0.18
Female -0.1330 0.0078 -17.01
Age20to24 0.2494 0.0260 9.61
Age25to29 0.3874 0.0254 15.23
Age30to39 0.5130 0.0252 20.34
Age40to49 0.5199 0.0254 20.45
Age50to59 0.5056 0.0257 19.68
Age60 0.4742 0.0297 15.98
Managerial 0.5694 0.0173 33.00
Professional 0.5104 0.0191 26.66
Assist.. prof & technical 0.4262 0.0180 23.63
Clerical & Secretarial 0.2423 0.0166 14.58
Craft & Skilled 0.2234 0.0159 14.03
Personal & Protective 0.0026 0.0345 0.08
Sales 0.1636 0.0206 7.94
Operative & assembly 0.0491 0.0161 3.05
Size 0.0004 0.0061 0.07
Single union -0.0636 0.0086 -7.40
Multiple union 0.0238 0.0120 1.97
EGW 0.0103 0.0212 0.49
Construction 0.0694 0.0167 4.16
W&R -0.0859 0.0134 -6.42
H&R -0.2527 0.0163 -15.46
T&C -0.0404 0.0115 -3.51
Financial services 0.0581 0.0159 3.65
Obs 0.0612 0.0128 4.80
Correction term (0) -0.0947 0.0316 -3.00
Correction term (1) -0.1094 0.0239 -4.58
Correction term (2) -0.1139 0.0247 -4.61
Correction term (3) -0.1051 0.0310 -3.39
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32